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It is a truth universally acknowledged that long-term defense planning is an essential practice
that all developed armed forces should undertake. Or is it? It is an article of faith among many
defense officials that long-term defense planning is the gold standard in the development and
management of modern armed forces. One NATO report states: “Long term planning … is
essential to organisations facing the combined impact of uncertainty of the future and little
flexibility with regards to resource employment.” In the case of the United States, this is
manifested in the Defense Department’s Future Year Defense Program (FYDP).  Furthermore,
long-term defense planning is an essential part of programming within the Department of
Defense — i.e. the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system (PPBE). As such,
it is perceived by some as being managed by the department’s high priests of programming
alchemy, and heretical questioning of this liturgy is simply not countenanced.
It is surprising that something so central to U.S. and allied defense planning is so poorly
understood, especially in terms of its provenance and original intent. There is little questioning
of whether it provides utility in the contemporary fluid security environment. Moreover, one is
hard-pressed to find critical analyses of how long-term defense planning can respond, in a
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timely fashion, to disruptive technological innovation or address immediate requirements
derived from ongoing battlefield experience. Instead, closer examination of long-term defense
planning methods shows that it has contributed to producing sub-optimal defense plans,
which in the case of Central and Eastern Europe  are rarely executed. Meanwhile, the process is
typically managed in a needlessly complex and opaque manner which obviates producing
institutional transparency. Indeed, in its worst manifestations, absent strong policy control,
long-term defense plans arguably isolate policy priorities from financial execution. We find one
example of this in the Department of the Navy, where “planning” has devolved into rudderless
“strategic budgeting” with a strong emphasis on acquisition.
Three points demonstrate why it makes sense to question the utility of long-term defense
planning. First, defense officials need to know the academic and professional literature in
favor of long-term defense planning is meager at best and simply facile and unconvincing
(e.g., Nicole Ball and Len Le Roux’s assertion that long-term planning is essential to producing
viable defense plans). Second, a review of long-term defense planning methods demonstrates
that it is plagued with muddled concepts and imprecisions in nomenclature, which contribute
to isolating policy from financial execution, while impeding the development of viable defense
plans. Third, it is unclear that long-term defense planning can respond quickly to new threats
or unique opportunities, or successfully weather periods of financial uncertainty, let alone
enable planning continuity during escalation. Ultimately, if not properly conceptualized and
made responsive to policy priorities, long-term defense planning, and indeed PPBE itself,
impedes policies from being executed along financially feasible lines.
These three points warrant further argument.
First, modern long-term defense planning finds its origins in the early years of the Kennedy
administration when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appointed Charles Hitch as
assistant secretary of defense (comptroller). Hitch, along with Roland N. McKean, were the
authors of a well-regarded work published in 1960 that took the then-novel approach of looking
at defense planning as an economic, and not just a military, challenge. Alain C. Enthoven and
K. Wayne Smith, who were on Hitch’s team, later identified the key challenge to bring unity of
effort to defense:
Perhaps the key reason for the limited usefulness of the defense budget was the fact that defense
budgeting was, in effect, conceived as being largely unrelated to military strategy. The two were
treated as almost independent activities. They were carried out by different people, at different
times, with different terms of reference, and without a method for integrating their activities.
McNamara put the services on notice that he expected to see, inter alia, the full life-cycle costs
of all new proposed acquisitions. He directed Hitch and his team to develop “programming” for
Fiscal Year 1963 in only six months to provide a single method of preparing the annual defense
budget, as well as to establish guidance for future planning in the form of costed capability
proposals. Yet the new programming system left untouched the existing budget structure,
leaving key weaknesses in the planning system that predated programming.
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Long-term defense planning became a basic tenet of PPBE because the military departments
had to produce detailed financial projections for the fiscal year for which funds were being
planned, plus the following four years, which was compiled into a five-year plan. This practice
became enshrined in law in 1987 in 10 USC § 221, creating the FYDP, which is used by the
Secretary of Defense to project expenditures and proposed budget requests. But the creators
of PPBE claimed that their long-term plan was never envisaged to be inflexible; it was only a
projection of financial implications of past decisions and planning assumptions to bring
needed financial context for planning. Indeed, they argued that it would provide officials with
the flexibility to shift priorities in the future since they could fully appreciate the potential
financial consequences of a decision to change directions. It is long past due to reconsider
returning to the original intentions of its creators.
The origins of long-term defense planning have a number of salient implications for the
present. Most importantly, PPBE was designed explicitly to meet the rigid bureaucratic
structures and political realities within the U.S. government. Uniquely different from other
Western ministries of defense, the U.S. Department of Defense remains a confederacy of
independent organizations, each with their own jealously guarded budgetary autonomy and
legally-defined institutional responsibilities and functions. Further, as the military departments’
individual PPBE systems have evolved, they have succeeded in isolating administrations’
policy priorities from financial execution precisely in a way unforeseen or intended by the
creators of PPBE. That is, the systems have prevented secretaries of defense from quickly
changing priorities, such as procuring mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs)
during the war in Iraq.
Once a new platform or system is approved and put into a program, experience demonstrates
that it is extremely difficult to defund for political and/or bureaucratic reasons. Thus, by using
the current prevailing logic behind long-term defense planning, weapons and platforms
deemed not fit for purpose in actual combat operations would have to remain funded since
they are in the plan : The Crusader self-propelled artillery system and the B-2 bomber providing
cases in point. As another example, aircraft carriers are built to last 50 years. In light of current
technological advances, is it prudent to assume that immensely expensive platforms
commissioned today will be needed in 2068? The reality is: Once someone’s preferred
platform or capability is in a Program Objective Memorandum, it is exceedingly hard for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to kill it.
Second, while the creators of programming never intended the five-year defense plan to be
rigid, that is precisely what it has become. Intra-service struggles amongst communities and
platform advocates inevitably generate compromises and promises, meaning future plans are
declared “baked” and there is great bureaucratic reluctance to change. Additionally, confusion
of the purpose and utility of the FYDP has resulted via an infelicitous usage of nomenclature.
Clarity in thinking has been inhibited by the practice of conflating planning, programming, and
acquisition as if they were one, single process. This, in turn, impedes continuity in policy
oversight. Practice demonstrates that the former activity is all too often ignored by
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programmers (e.g., U.S. Department of the Navy). Alas, Congress has been unhelpful in this
regard with its mandate for the services to draft 30-year platform plans like the Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding Plan.
Third, the utility of long-term defense planning needs to be assessed in terms of its ability to
support successful planning continuity in periods of financial uncertainty and throughout
periods of escalation. As to the former point, during the early years of this decade,
congressionally mandated sequestration of the federal budget under the terms of the Budget
Control Act (which had the aim of reducing the federal government’s deficit), stressed both the
U.S. Departments of the Navy and Air Force’s PPBE to the point that they collapsed due to
financial uncertainty. The contemporary practice of successive Congresses passing
continuing resolution agreements, while delaying passing a final defense appropriation act
until well within the new fiscal year, has also undermined the utility of long-term defense
planning. This experience alone underscores Henry Mintzberg’s critique that programming has
never been successfully implemented. As such, programming may only be appropriate in an
environment where there is budgetary certainty and/or geopolitical stability, for example, the
unique period of the strategic balance during the Cold War.
Additionally, it is problematic that long-term defense planning methods can survive the stress
that would inevitably befall policy officials and planners in periods of escalation leading to and
including wartime. From this, it is clear that the FYDP has not been designed with the objective
of ensuring methodological continuity and functionality during escalation, i.e., peace, tension,
crisis, and war. If one accepts the Western practice that officials should prepare a defense
institution to be able to conduct effective military operations, logic dictates that defense
planning methods must be applicable throughout the entire spectrum of escalation and not
just during peacetime.
While this point has not been widely discussed by officials or analysts, the FYDP has proven
itself unwieldy during periods of war, notwithstanding Enthoven and Smith’s lengthy, but
unconvincing, argument to the contrary in the context of the Vietnam war. The reality is that
the U.S. Department of Defense maintains two different defense planning systems — PPBE
and Operations and Overseas Contingency funding — which has led to severe criticism by
some influential members of Congress.
In sum, long-term defense planning has devolved into a practice different from what its
creators envisaged. It has become an instrument military departments can use to insulate
themselves from successive administrations’ policies and priorities in order to protect their
favored programs. Planning budgets two fiscal years in advance of a current budget year
encourages insulation from policy when such completed plans are declared to be “baked” and
not subject for review.
Thus, in light of a fluid international security environment which demonstrates no signs of
becoming more predictable, a congressional budgeting system that has yet to provide funding
certainty, and increasing technological disruptions, defense officials and Congress should
review current law and policy related to long-term defense planning. A hard review of current
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political realities and financial conditions provides an argument for returning to the original
purpose of long-term defense planning: becoming once again a database of projected costs
associated with the current and planned force, not an impediment that limits officials’ ability to
shift priorities to meet the requirements of the force today. In the end, the utility of these
financial projections should be judged on how much flexibility they provide officials to change
the way money is being spent to produce relevant defense outcomes, even in the short term if
necessary, in order to win wars and save lives.  In this context, Eisenhower’s dictum remains
relevant to this day: plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.
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